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MODIFICATION AND DISSOLUTION OF
ADMINISTRATIVE ORDERS
AND INJUNCTIONS*
By EDWARD A. ToMLINSON**
The permanence of most cease and desist orders issued by admin-
istrative agencies and of injunctions obtained by them in the federal
courts is admittedly not one of the most pressing problems of admin-
istrative procedure today. On the other hand, the indefinite duration
of these decrees raises problems that are more than minor irritants.
Decrees may lose their effectiveness as enforcement devices as they
lie dormant over a period of time. As their value for enforcement
purposes diminishes, their capacity to inconvenience and hurt respond-
ents often increases. This is particularly likely to occur with cease
and desist orders issued by the Federal Trade Commission (FTC)
in restraint of trade cases and antitrust decrees obtained in the federal
courts by the Antitrust Division of the Department of Justice. Many
of these orders and injunctions seek to restore competitive conditions
by including provisions enjoining conduct not otherwise prohibited
by law. With the passage of time and change in conditions they may
lose their effectiveness and even become anti-competitive in effect.
One solution to this problem would be to limit the duration of
cease and desist orders and injunctions to a set period of time. This
approach is appropriate in a number of areas and, as discussed in the
* This article is based on a report prepared by the author as a consultant to the
Committee on Compliance and Enforcement Proceedings of the Administrative Confer-
ence of the United States. The report was submitted to the Conference in support of
the Committee's Recommendation on the Modification and Dissolution of Orders and
Injunctions. The Administrative Conference adopted that recommendation as Recom-
mendation 30 of the Conference at its Sixth Plenary Session on December 7, 1971.
Its text appears below in note 1. The views expressed in the report and in this article
are those of the author and have not been approved by the Committee or the Conference.
The Administrative Conference of the United States is a permanent executive
agency established by Act of Congress. 5 U.S.C. §§ 571-76 (1970). It consists of a
chairman and between seventy-five and ninety-one voting members. The membership
of the Conference includes federal agency heads and leading practitioners and scholars
of administrative law. The principal responsibility of the Conference is to "study the
efficiency, adequacy, and fairness of the administrative procedure used by administra-
tive agencies in carrying out administrative programs, and make recommendations to
administrative agencies, collectively or individually, and to the President, Congress, or
the Judicial Conference of the United States, in connection therewith, as it considers
appropriate." 5 U.S.C. § 574(1) (1970).
The Committee on Compliance and Enforcement Proceedings solicited the
comments of ten agencies on an earlier version of this recommendation and report.
Those agencies were the Securities and Exchange Commission, Federal Trade Com-
mission, National Labor Relations Board, Food and Drug Administration, Interstate
Commerce Commission, Federal Maritime Commission, Department of Agriculture,
Department of Labor, Antitrust Division in the Department of Justice, and Civil
Rights Division in the Department of Justice. All ten agencies provided helpful com-
ments and criticism, and the Committee and the author are grateful for their assistance.
These responses were considered by the Committee and led to several important
changes in the recommendation. The substance of a number of these comments has
also been incorporated into this article. In addition to receiving these formal comments,
the author also conferred informally with the enforcement staffs at the FTC, NLRB,
and Department of Labor.
** Professor of Law, University of Maryland School of Law; A.B., 1961, Prince-
ton University; A.M., 1962, University of Washington; J.D., 1965, Harvard University,
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body of this article, has been used successfully by several agencies,
especially the Antitrust Division in the Department of Justice. While
similar innovations should be encouraged where appropriate, permanent
decrees remain desirable in many areas. For instance, a decree that
enjoins a specific variety of illegal conduct should not normally expire
after a given number of years. Such. a decree would in effect notify the
respondent that. after the expiration date he would be free to renew
his course of illegal conduct without fear of contempt penalties and
force the agency to initiate a new enforcement proceeding. Further-
more, at the time the decree is entered the existence of conditions-
that might call for its subsequent modification or dissolution may be
either unknown or speculative.
A better solution to the problems posed by permanent decrees is
therefore to improve procedures for modifying or vacating outdated
decrees. Only a minority of agencies have available formal procedures
whereby a respondent may request an agency to modify or dissolve
a cease and desist order issued by it or to join the respondent in
requesting a court to modify or dissolve an injunction or order over
which the court retains exclusive jurisdiction. Recommendation 301
of the Administrative Conference of the United States proposes
that all agencies which issue or obtain a significant number of decrees
1. The text of the recommendation as approved by the Conference is as follows:
REcOMMENDATION 30: Modification and Dissolution of Orders and Injunctions
Cease and desist orders issued by administrative agencies and injunctions obtained
by administrative agencies from the federal courts in the enforcement of regulatory
statutes have generally been permanent in duration. As a result of this practice,
many orders and injunctions now outstanding are decades old. Such outstanding
orders and injunctions may serve no useful purpose and often cause inconvenience
and hardship to the respondents. A number of agencies have experimented suc-
cessfully with techniques for limiting the duration of certain types of orders and
injunctions to a set period of time, but this approach is not appropriate in many
circumstances. To deal with this situation agencies should therefore have avail-
able procedures whereby respondents may seek modification or dissolution of
outstanding orders and injunctions.
RECOmMENDATION
A. Agency Cease-and-Desist Orders
Each federal agency that issues a significant number of cease-and-desist
orders over which it retains jurisdiction should have a procedure available where-
by a respondent may request the agency. to, modify or vacate a cease-and-desist
order that has become final The factors considered by the agency in ruling upon
such a request should include: the period of time the order has been in effect;
changed conditions of fact or law during that period; the respondent's compli-
ance with the order; the likelihood of further violations of the order; the
hardship which the order imposes on the respondent; the extent of the respondent's
compliance with requirements of law that are related to those covered by the
order; the interests of other persons or parties affected by the order; the import-
ance of the order to the agency's overall enforcement program; and the public
interest in the enforcement of the law.
B. Court-Enforced Orders
Each federal agency that obtains a significant number of injunctions in the
federal courts or issues a significant number of cease-and-desist orders which
are enforced by federal courts that retain by statute exclusive jurisdiction over
the orders should have a procedure available whereby a respondent may request
the agency to join or concur with it in moving the court to modify or vacate
such an injunction or order or, in the case of an order issued by the agency, to
remand the proceeding to the agency for that purpose. The factors considered
by the agency in acting upon such a request should include those stated in para-
graph A.
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establish such procedures' and attempts to itemize the ,factors. which
an agency should consider in determining whether' it is desirable
that an outstanding decree remain in force in its .present form... The
party seeking modification or dissolution should, of. course, have :the
burden of initiating the proceeding and of demonstrating that.'these
factors justify' modifying or vacating an outstanding decree......
'PROBLEMS AssoCIATED WITH -PERMANENT -DECREES •
Variety of Enforcement Techi ique s
Administrative agencies enforce regulatory statutes in a variety
of ways. At least three ways are relevant to this report. FirstA
substantial number of agencies have statutory authority to issue cease
and desist orders; once these orders become final, sanctions 'may be
imposed for violations thereof. The FTC, for example, issues 'cease
and desist orders which become effective a prescribed number of days
after issuance if the respondent does not seek judicial review, or A
prescribed number of days after the order has been affirmed or enforced
by a court on appeal if the respondent petitions for judicial review.
Such. orders are enforceable through actions for civil penalties in: the
federal district'courts:2 -'The Interstate Commerce Commisti'on.:.(ICC)
also has authority to issue cease and desist orders in motor carrier
cases and may suspend'or revoke the certificate'or "permit of a motor
carrier that wilfully 'violates such an order.' Violators ofI'CC orders
may also be fined:-in the'district courts if the violation is, both wilful
and knowing." Second, an agency may have statutory authority to
issue cease and desist orders but sanctions may not be imposed for
violations thereof until the order has been enforced by a review-
ing court. Obedience to the court's decree is then enforced through
the contempt power. This cumbersome enforcement procedure, which
was more prevalent in the past, is presently found only at the National
Labor Relations Board (NLRB), and the Administrative Conference
recommended at its second Plenary Session that the present NLRB
procedure be replaced by a procedure similar to that employed by the
FTC. and ICC.' Third, a large number of agencies with enforcement
responsibilties do not have statutory authority to issue cease and desist
orders, or have only limited authority to do so;'in order to restrain
violations of the law they must go directly to the federal district courts
to seek injunctions.- Among the agencies in this category are the
Food and Drug Administration (FDA), the Antitrust Division in
the Department of Justice, and the Fair Labor Standards Administra-
tion (FLSA) in the Department of Labor. The ICC and the Securities
and Exchange Commission (SEC) also obtain a significant number
of court injunctions but in addition enforce their regulatory statutes
2. 15 U.S.C. § 45(1) (1970). See, e.g., Herbold Laboratory, Inc. v. United
States, 413 F.2d 342 (9th Cir. 1969).
3. Frozen Foods Express v. United States, 351 U.S. 40 (1956).
4. 49 U.S.C. § 322(a) (1970).
5. ADMINISTRATIVE CONFERENCE OF THE UNITED STATES, RECOMMENDATIONS AND
REPORTS OF THE ADMINISTRATIVE CONFERENCE OF THE UNITED STATES, Recommenda-
tion 10, at 24 (1970).
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through the issuance of cease and desist orders (ICC) or stop orders
(SEC). A fourth enforcement technique analogous to the three listed
above is the authority of many agencies to enforce regulatory provisions
against individuals or businesses by censuring them or by suspending or
revoking a license, certificate, registration or some other valuable right
bestowed or controlled by the agency. The sanction of revocation has a
permanent effect similar to that of most cease and desist orders and in-junctions. Prominent among the federal agencies with these powers
are the Federal Communications Commission (FCC), SEC, Federal
Aviation Authority (FAA), and the Coast Guard in the Department
of Transportation.
Number of Outstanding Decrees
Accurate statistics are not available on the number and vintage of
cease and desist orders and injunctions presently in force. The agencies
contacted in the preparation of this report do not have readily available
any tabulation of the number of orders or injunctions which they are
presently responsible for enforcing. A general idea of the number of
decrees outstanding for each agency may be obtained, however, from
the total number of cease and desist orders issued by the agency or
injunctions obtained by it in past years. The great majority of these
orders and injunctions will still be in effect because in the past orders
and injunctions have generally been of permanent duration and because
instances of modification or dissolution are infrequent under present
law and practice. Of course, many of the orders and injunctions that
are still technically in force have no present impact because the
respondent has died or gone out of business or because the practice
enjoined was prevalent in the past but is not likely to recur today.
The FLSA, FTC, NLRB and the Antitrust Division have issued
or obtained the largest number of orders or injunctions. The staffs
of these agencies were contacted individually in the preparation of
this report and supplied the following information in the spring of
1970. Since its inception in 1938, the FLSA has obtained between
30,000 and 35,000 court injunctions, and 25,000 of these date from
1963 or earlier. The FTC issued 8,511 cease and desist orders in
restraint of trade and deceptive practices cases through fiscal 1969,
and 4,090 of these orders were issued prior to 1951. The NLRB
obtained 3,131 court decrees enforcing in whole or in part Board
cease and desist orders between July 5, 1935 and the end of fiscal
1969. That total, however, does not include court decrees granted by
consent, summarily, or upon default. The General Counsel's staff has
no tabulation of the exact number of enforced decrees that fall into
these latter categories, but it is very likely equal to or greater than
the number of contested decrees. Exact figures are also not available
on the number of antitrust decrees obtained by the Antitrust Division.
The recent Stigler Report indicates that the number of outstanding
decrees is quite large and that many of these decrees are more than
twenty-five years old.6
6. REPORT OF THE TASK FORCE ON PRODUCTIVrrY AND COMPETITION III, D (1969)(Stigler Report to President Nixon).
1971]
MARYLAND LAW REVIEW
Other agencies which have obtained significant numbers of court
injunctions include the SEC, the ICC and (to a lesser extent) the
FDA. The SEC maintains an up-to-date summary on the number
of injunctions obtained by it. From 1934 to June 30, 1969, the SEC
obtained 1,587 injunctions against 5,022 defendants. In addition,
twenty-three injunction actions were pending on June 30, 1969.7 The
ICC's annual reports indicate that it is presently initiating injunction
actions at the rate of 100 per year, and has thus probably accumulated
over the years quite a few thousand court injunctions. The FDA,
on the other hand, relies primarily on seizure actions to enforce the
legal prohibitions against misbranded and adulterated commodities
and in recent years has sought only twenty-five or thirty injunctions
each year.
Scope of Orders and In]unctions
The scope of cease and desist orders and injunctions is relevant
to the problem of their duration. Some decrees are very broad in
scope and others quite narrow. Injunctions under the Fair Labor
Standards Act are almost invariably framed in the broad language of
the statute and simply require the employer to obey the wages and
hours, overtime and record-keeping provisions of the Act. An employer
may be held in contempt for the violation of such an injunction."
Occasionally the injunction is limited to particular employees or to a
particular department or plant, but more commonly the injunction
covers the entire operations of an employer. Likewise, cease and
desist orders issued by the NLRB are quite often broad in scope.
When there is a likelihood of further violations, the order need not be
limited in scope to the particular unfair labor practice committed by
the respondent.9 Thus, an order may in general terms enjoin an
employer or union from interfering with the section 7 rights'0 of
employees to self-organization or enjoin a union from interfering with
the organizational rights of employees of all employers within a given
area and not just of the employees of the particular employer where the
union's unfair labor practice occurred." Injunctions obtained by the
ICC tend to be narrower in scope and to restrain only particular
unlawful practices such as an unlawful mode of carriage. In some
cases SEC injunctions are also narrow in scope, but the SEC often
obtains injunctions that are not limited to particular securities but which
enjoin the respondent from violating the registration provisions of the
statute with respect to any security.' 2 The appropriate scope of FTC
orders has engendered a substantial amount of controversy and litiga-
tion. Generally the FTC seeks to frame a cease and desist order which
is broader in scope than the particular violation committed by the
respondent. The order may enjoin analogous violations, violations with
7. SEC, THIRTY-FIFTH ANN. REP. (1969).
8. McComb v. Jacksonville Paper Co., 336 U.S. 187 (1949).
9. NLRB v. Express Publishing Co., 312 U.S. 426, 435-37 (1941).
10. National Labor Relations Act § 7, 29 U.S.C. § 157 (1970).
11. L. JAFFE, JUDICIAL CONTROL OF ADMINISTRATIVE AcTioN 276-87 (1965).
12. See, e.g., SEC v. Jan-Dal Oil & Gas, Inc., 433 F.2d 304 (10th Cir. 1970).
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respect to different products or customers, or any and all violations
of a statutory provision. 8 FTC cease and desist orders may also re-
strain conduct not itself unlawful in order to ensure that a violation
of the law will not continue or be repeated.' 4 Antitrust decrees obtained
by the Department of Justice likewise often seek to restore competitive
conditions by enjoining conduct not otherwise prohibited by law.
Enforcement of Old Orders and Injunctions
Substantial uncertainty surrounds the enforceability of cease and
desist orders and injunctions that are years or decades old. May an
agency seek civil penalties or contempt for the violation of an order
or injunction that has remained outstanding for a long period of time?
This question is particularly pertinent with respect to decrees that are
quite broad or simply repeat the prohibitions of the statute. Enforce-
ment of these decrees on a continuing basis would transform the enforce-
ment pattern from one where violators of the law are "fenced in" by
cease and desist orders and injunctions which specify what they must
not do in the future, to one where the courts directly impose the
sanctions of civil or criminal contempt or of civil penalties for any and
all violations of the statute. If Congress had intended the latter enforce-
ment pattern to predominate, it could simply have made violations of
the statute a civil or criminal offense. Congress chose not to do this
because it believed that the broad language of most regulatory statutes
needed further refinement and specification before sanctions should be
imposed. That task has generally been delegated to administrative
agencies who have the responsibility for interpreting and enforcing the
law through issuing cease and desist orders or obtaining injunctions
from the courts.'
5
There are a number of prominent examples of old decrees that
have been enforced against respondents. In Wirtz v. Credit Bureau
of South Florida,16 Judge Dyer held a successor employer in civil
contempt of a Fair Labor Standards Act injunction issued twenty-three
years previously against a predecessor employer. During the intervening
period there had apparently been no violations of the injunction, but
the subsequent violations concerned the same class of employees as
the initial violations which led to the injunction. The 1920 antitrust
decree against the meat packers likewise remains in force. Efforts by
the respondents to secure modification have proved unsuccessful,'"
and the Department of Justice continues to enforce the decree. The
Department's most recent effort, however, ended unsuccessfully when
the Supreme Court construed the decree so as not to proscribe the
13. Kauper, Cease and Desist: The History, Effect, and Scope of Clayton Act
Orders of the Federal Trade Commission, 66 MIcH. L. REv. 1095, 1147-1210 (1968).
14. FTC v. Colgate Palmolive Co., 380 U.S. 374, 399 (1965) (Harlan, J., dis-
senting on other grounds) (deceptive practices case); FTC v. National Lead Co.,
352 U.S. 419, 430 (1957).
15. Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323 U.S. 134, 13740 (1944) (FLSA); NLRB v.
Hearst Publications, Inc., 322 U.S. 111, 128-32 (1944).
16. 51 CCH Lab. Cas. 31,658 (S.D. Fla. 1964).
17. United States v. Swift & Co., 189 F. Supp. 885 (N.D. Ill 1960), aff'd per
curiam, 367 U.S. 909 (1961).
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respondent's intended conduct.1" The FTC is also presently enforcing
a cease and desist order that dates back to 1944.1'
Agency efforts to compel compliance with the law normally do
not involve the enforcement of decrees of such vintage. Courts have
often made the enforcement of old orders difficult. In the lead case
of NLRB v. Reed & Prince Manufacturing Co.,20 Judge Magruder
did not permit the NLRB to bring contempt charges under an eleven-
year-old decree that permanently enjoined the employer from violating
the Act in any manner. The alleged contempt was the employer's
refusal to bargain with the union. A similar refusal to bargain had led
to the initial cease and desist order and its enforcement in the court
of appeals. The employer had complied with the decree, and the earlier
refusal to bargain was in no way connected with the later one. Judge
Magruder held that the decree was still viable and in effect, but that
a contempt proceeding was inappropriate on these facts and that the
Board should try the subsequent refusal to bargain as an unfair labor
practice. The courts of appeals should not be burdened with trying
as contempt subsequent violations of a decree which are unrelated to
the initial violation. In such cases it is the Board's responsibility to
bring a new unfair labor practice proceeding to find the facts and
apply the law. The Board's decision would then be subject, of course,
to the normal judicial review.
This approach has more recently been adopted by the Fifth Circuit
in a case in which it granted enforcement of a broad cease and desist
order issued by the NLRB.21 In Southwire Co. v. NLRB, the re-
spondent-employer had violated the rights of its employees to self-
organization through interrogations, threats, general interference with
rights of its employees to self-organization, and discriminatory dis-
charges. The court enforced an order which permanently enjoined
the employer from violating the section 7 rights of employees to self-
organization, but made it clear that violations "outside the class with
which we are dealing should be left to the normal unfair practice
procedures under the Act rather than to the contempt power of the
court."' 22 Thus, the full extent of a broad decree may not be enforceable
at any time through contempt proceedings. These considerations on
the respective roles of the agency and the court in the enforcement
process do not apply, of course, when enforcement is by injunction
(for example, under the Fair Labor Standards Act), because then
the district court tries both the initial violation and any subsequent
contempt. Courts may, therefore, be less chary about contempt pro-
ceedings under broad injunctions because there is no danger that a
court will abrogate an administrative function.
Informal inquiries at the NLRB and the FTC indicate that the
enforcement staffs of those agencies agree with the general approach
of Reed & Prince that administrative orders whose terms are permanent
18. United States v. Armour & Co., 402 U.S. 673 (1971).
19. National Biscuit Co. v. FTC, 400 F.2d 270 (5th Cir. 1968).
20. 196 F.2d 755 (1st Cir. 1952).
21. Southwire Co. v. NLRB, 383 F.2d 235 (5th Cir. 1967)
22. Id. at 238.
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remain in effect indefinitely but that contempt or civil penalty proceed-
ings are not appropriate sanctions under certain circumstances. In
each instance where a respondent violates an order that has been
in force for many years, the staff makes a determination whether a
contempt proceeding or an action for civil penalties is appropriate or
whether the agency should initiate a new administrative proceeding
leading to the issuance of another cease and desist order. Among the
factors taken into consideration in deciding whether or not to impose
sanctions for the violation of the original order are the lapse of time
since the entry of the order, the extent of respondent's compliance
with the order in the intervening period, any connection between the
initial and the subsequent violation, the wilfullness of the subsequent
violation, the clarity of the law surrounding the subsequent violation,
and any similarity between the initial and subsequent violations. There
does not appear to be, however, any official policy statement describing
when the agency will seek contempt or civil penalties and when it will
initiate a new administrative proceeding. The FTC staff appears willing
to discuss this matter informally with a respondent whose subsequent
conduct violates a long-standing cease and desist order.
The Effects of Long-standing Orders and Injunctions
Agencies generally favor orders and injunctions that are perma-
nent in duration. Such orders and injunctions serve as deterrents
and encourage compliance with the law regardless of whether they
remain fully enforceable by contempt or civil penalties. Respondents
subject to these restraints are likely to be more careful about obeying
the law and thus ease the enforcement task of agencies which do not
have sufficient staff to investigate all potential violators. 2  Agencies
also believe that any order or injunction, no matter how old, retains
some vitality because a violation may still occur that is sufficiently
related to the initial violation which led to the order or injunction
to justify a contempt or civil penalty proceeding. The FTC in the
complex area of pre-1959 Robinson-Patman Act 24 orders also believes
that it would lose important advantages if it could not obtain enforce-
ment of these old orders but had to seek new orders. When the FTC
enforces the old order, a respondent cannot raise defenses that were
available to him when the order was orginally issued and may not be
able to deny that his price differentials injure competition."
Respondents are generally unhappy about old orders and injunc-
tions. Specific provisions in these decrees may become outdated and
restrict the conduct of the respondent long after the need for the
restriction has passed. Broad, vague orders and injunctions may also
deter respondents from introducing new and improved business practices
because the applicability of the decrees to the new practices is uncertain.
Outstanding orders and injunctions may also have unfavorable collateral
23. See Goldberg v. Cockrell, 303 F.2d 811 (5th Cir. 1962) (Wisdom, J.).
24. 15 U.S.C. §§ 13-13(c), 21a (1970).
25. See FTC v. Jantzen, Inc., 386 U.S. 228 (1967); FTC v. Standard Motor
Products, 371 F.2d 613, 615 (2d Cir. 1967) (Lumbard, J.).
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consequences in the credit and business world. A company subject to
a decree may experience trouble in obtaining a bank loan, issuing or
selling its stock or recruiting employees; an individual subject to decree
may also have trouble in obtaining a loan or securing a new job.26
Finally, long-standing orders and injunctions, especially those that
restrain conduct not itself unlawful, may have harmful economic
effects on the business of the respondent or on the whole economy.
This is particularly true of antitrust decrees that seek to restore com-
petition and cease and desist orders under the Robinson-Patman Act
that ban price differentials. Specific provisions in these decrees may
rapidly become outdated. "Many decrees under the antitrust laws,
including consent decrees, are of long or indefinite duration. The
effects of these decrees may change with the passage of time. Such
decrees may turn out to be ineffective or anti-competitive. '27
It must be acknowledged, however, that not enough is known
about the long-term effects of orders and injunctions.2
POSSIBLE LIMITATIONS ON DECREES
Limitation of Orders and Injunctions to a Set Period of Time
Agencies that were asked to comment on an earlier version of
this recommendation generally opposed any suggestion to place time
limits on decrees that enjoined only illegal conduct. Among the
decrees which fall into this category are injunctions obtained by the
SEC and the FLSA and cease and desist orders issued by the NLRB
and by the FTC in deceptive practices cases. Such limitations were
characterized in this framework as an invitation to the respondent
to violate the law again once that period expired. Our relative ignorance
on the effects of permanent decrees issued or obtained by these agencies
is another factor which favors approaching the problem through the
improvement of procedures for modification and dissolution, rather
than limiting initially the duration of decrees.
With respect to decrees that sought to restore or maintain con-
ditions by enjoining conduct not otherwise illegal or by requiring
affirmative action by the respondent, the agencies involved were more
receptive to time limitations. At least two agencies (the FTC and
26. See the allegations to this effect in Tobin v. Alma Mills, 192 F.2d 133 (4th
Cir. 1951) ; SEC v. Thermodynamics, Inc., 319 F. Supp. 1380, 1383 (D. Colo. 1970).
27. REPORT OF THE TASK FORCE ON ANTITRUST POLICY 12 (1968) (Neal Report
to President Johnson).
28. The Stigler Report recognized this information gap in connection with anti-
trust decrees:
Little is known of the extent to which a large number of past decrees are still
operative, and if operative, of any real value in protecting competition. We recom-
mend, therefore, some such procedure as this in dealing with outstanding decrees:
1. The past decrees still running should be compiled, and the types and dura-
tion of prescribed conduct summarized.
2. The current relevance of the decrees, or at least those running against
large industries, -should be examined - presumably by the economics section of the
Antitrust Division.
3. The older (say 25 years and over) and obsolete younger decrees should
be vacated.
REPORT OF THE TASK FORCE ON PRODUCTIVITY AND COMPETITION III, D (1969).
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the Antitrust Division) have successfully experimented with such
limits. FTC orders in restraint of trade cases often proscribe for
a period of ten years any acquisitions by the respondent company
that do not have Commission approval. Typical of a significant
number of other cases at the FTC is Luria Brothers & Co.,29 in which
the order prohibited the respondent steel companies from purchasing
for a period of five years more than fifty percent of their annual
requirements of iron and steel scrap at any given plant from respondent
Luria Brothers.
The Antitrust Division has likewise found it appropriate in many
"rule of reason"30 cases to limit the duration of an injunction to a set
period of time. In "rule of reason" cases the respondents' practices
are considered to be unlawful on account of their anti-competitive effect
in a specific business context. That context may, of course, change
with the passage of time. Injunctions limited to a set period of time
may even be appropriate in some cases of per se violations of the
antitrust laws. In per se cases the likelihood of the practice resulting
in a net anti-competitive effect is so great in the majority of cases as
to make unnecessary any inquiry by the court on the competitive effects
of the practice in a particular case. For instance, the Antitrust Division
maintains that the systematic practice of reciprocity represents a
per se violation of the antitrust laws. Remedial injunctions in rec-
iprocity cases often involve a subtle regulation of the respondent's
bookkeeping and of the relationship between the respondent's purchas-
ing and selling personnel. Because such injunctive provisions intrude
into daily business operations, the Division generally limits their
term to a period of ten years with the expectation that the ten year
period will be sufficient to break up the illegal practice.
The present policies of the Antitrust Division and the FTC go
a long way towards implementing the recommendations of the Neal
and Stigler Reports. Both of those reports recommended limiting
the effect of antitrust decrees, including consent decrees, to a period
of ten years. They emphasized that decrees should not involve the
long-term regulation of a company or whole industry by the Depart-
ment of Justice but should operate to restore competition within ten
years. A similar proposal (with fifteen or twenty year limits) has
been advanced by a former chief of the General Litigation Section
of the Antitrust Division.8 1 The Neal Report specifically included
FTC cease and desist orders in its recommendation and proposed a
drastic overhaul of the Robinson-Patman Act. Orders under that
Act would be limited to five years, with no provision for renewal.
The recommendations of both the Neal and Stigler Reports are, of
course, primarily directed to decrees that seek to restore competitive
conditions by enjoining otherwise lawful conduct; the considerations
29. 62 F.T.C. 243 (1963).
30. For a detailed explanation of the antitrust rule of reason and the per se
concept under the antitrust laws, see Bork, The Rule of Reason and the Per Se
Concept: Price Fixing and Market Division, 74 YALE L.J. 775 (1965); Part II, 75
YALE L.J. 375 (1966).
31. Kramer, Modification of Consent Decrees: A Proposal to the Antitrust
Division, 56 Mica. L. REv. 1051, 1065 (1958).
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which favor limiting such orders to a set period of time are not
applicable to most decrees that enjoin only unlawful conduct.
The federal courts have had little experience with decrees whose
terms are limited to a set period of time. District judges in the
South have occasionally limited injunctions under the Fair Labor
Standards Act to a predetermined number of years. The Department
of Labor generally opposes such action and seeks permanent injunctions.
There is some indication that some district judges in the South who
are out of sympathy with the Act and with "government by injunction"
either refuse to issue an injunction at all or issue an injunction limited
in duration to a couple of years even though the government has
proved the existence of past violations and the likelihood of their
recurrence in the future. The Fifth Circuit has consistently rejected
this approach. 82 In recent years, however, the courts have approved
consent decrees proposed by the Antitrust Division that bar reciprocal
dealings or the acquisition of competitors for ten years only.83
Modification or Dissolution of Orders and Injunctions
The leading case on the modification or dissolution of judicial
decrees is United States v. Swift & Co. 4 Under the rule in Swift,
a court has inherent power to modify or dissolve its own injunctions
but should exercise that power only upon "a clear showing of grievous
wrong evoked by new and unforeseen conditions."3 This stringent
limitation on modification operated to prevent Swift and the other
meat packers from obtaining in 1960 modification of an antitrust
decree first entered in 1920.38
Swift involved a consent decree as to which it might be argued
that the respondent had agreed to the restraint and had received sub-
stantial benefits in exchange (including avoidance of a trial and
immunity from treble damage suits). Courts have nevertheless applied
the Swift rule to other situations. It has been applied to injunctions
obtained from the courts by administrative agencies, 87 and even to
injunctions obtained by one private party against another." Courts
have also refused to dissolve injunctions when the party seeking
dissolution could show no more than compliance with the injunction
over a long period of time.3"
32. Goldberg v. Cockrell, 303 F.2d 811 (5th Cir. 1962) (Wisdom, J.) (districtjudge abused discretion in limiting injunction to one year; permanent injunction
entered).
33. United States v. National Bank & Trust Co., 1970 Trade Cas. ff 73,375, at
89,501 (E.D. Pa. 1970) (ban on acquisitions without the permission of the Attorney
General) ; United States v. United States Steel Corp., 1969 Trade Cas. 1 72,826, at
87,025 (W.D. Pa. 1969) (reciprocal dealings).
34. 286 U.S. 106 (1932).
35. Id. at 119.
36. United States v. Swift & Co., 189 F. Supp. 885, 910-12 (N.D. Ill. 1960), aff'd
per curiam, 367 U.S. 909 (1961).
37. Wirtz v. Graham Transfer & Storage Co., 322 F.2d 650 (5th Cir. 1963)(Wisdom, J.) (FLSA case) ; SEC v. LeBrock, 245 F. Supp. 799 (S.D.N.Y. 1965).
38. Humble Oil & Refining Co. v. American Oil Co., 405 F.2d 803 (8th Cir. 1969)(Blackmun, J.) (injunction against unfair competition).
39. Walling v. Harnischfeger Corp., 242 F.2d 712 (7th Cir. 1957). "Compliance
is just what the law expects." Id. at 713.
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A few courts have been somewhat more liberal in allowing
modification or dissolution. In Tobin v. Alma Mills,40 the court
affirmed the district judge's dissolution of a ten-year-old Fair Labor
Standards Act injunction. The respondent demonstrated that it had
fully complied with the injunction and that the injunction was inter-
fering with the sale of its stock. Such a showing seems somewhat
less than the showing of "grievous wrong" required by Swift. The
Second Circuit in King-Seeley Thermos Co. v. Aladdin Industries"
also took a more liberal view and held that injunctions obtained by
private parties in trademark litigation could be modified even in the
absence of changed circumstances if a better appreciation of the facts
in light of experience indicated that the decree was not accomplishing
its purposes. The Humble Oil decision was expressly rejected as
imposing too severe a restriction on the court's equity power to
reconcile competing private rights. Of course, the existence of com-
peting private rights distinguishes King-Seeley from cases in which
a decree only enjoins conduct that is illegal.
The rigid Swift rule should not apply to modification or dissolution
by an agency of its own cease and desist orders. Agencies should
retain greater flexibility in enforcing the requirements of the law.
Statutes often confer on agencies broad power to modify or set aside
their orders. The Interstate Commerce Act gives the ICC a "continu-
ing jurisdiction" over its orders, allowing it to modify or even rescind
a great variety of them at any time. 42 The FTC also has statutory
authority to modify or set aside a cease and desist order that has
become final following the respondent's failure to petition for judicial
review within the prescribed time whenever "conditions of fact or of
law have so changed as to require such action or if the public interest
shall so require." ' The FTC's authority to modify or set aside an
order that has been enforced by a reviewing court is not clear from
the statute. There is strong authority, however, that the modification
or dissolution of an FTC order that has been affirmed or enforced
by a court remains an administrative matter within the agency's
competence." The FTC's Rules of Practice accordingly provide that
the agency may modify or set aside any cease and desist order that has
become final, regardless of whether the order became final because
the time for seeking judicial review expired or because the order
was affirmed or enforced by a court.45 Other agencies, however, may
not be able to modify or set aside orders issued by them which have
40. 192 F.2d 133 (4th Cir. 1951).
41. 418 F.2d 31 (2d Cir. 1969) (Friendly, J.).
42. Interstate Commerce Act §§ 17(6), (7), 49 U.S.C. §§ 17(6), (7), 321(b)
(1970). See Alamo Express, Inc. v. United States, 239 F. Supp. 694, 697-98 (W.D.
Tex. 1965).
43. 15 U.S.C. §§ 21(b), 45(b) (1970). See Martin-Marietta Corp. v. FTC, 376
F.2d 430 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 923 (1967) (FTC's refusal to modify not
reviewable).
44. American Chain & Cable Co. v. FTC, 142 F.2d 909 (4th Cir. 1944)
(Parker, J.).
45. 16 C.F.R. 3.72 (1971).
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been enforced by a reviewing court because the court retains by
statute "exclusive jurisdiction" over the order.4
The enforcement staffs at the FTC and NLRB report that there
have not been any significant efforts by respondents to obtain modifica-
tion or dissolution of long-standing orders. Perhaps respondents are
hesitant to make such requests because they anticipate that their efforts
will be unsuccessful or because they fear that petitions for modifica-
tion or dissolution will alert these agencies to orders that they have
otherwise forgotten about. The absence of any publicized procedures
at the NLRB may also deter requests at that agency. In addition,
modification is a two-way street, and respondents may fear that
the agency staff will react to a petition for modification or dissolution
by seeking modification to obtain more effective relief against the
respondent. The Supreme Court has held that the Government may
secure modification of an antitrust decree to obtain the additional
remedy of dissolution if the original provisions of the decree have
proved ineffective in achieving the goal of workable competition.
47
The Court held that Swift was inapplicable to such a request by the
Government for modification. The FTC staff is presently seeking
at the Commission level to modify a cease and desist order against
National Dairy to include more restrictive provisions. The Court
of Appeals for the District of Columbia has already upheld the FTC's
earlier effort to modify a cease and desist order in a false advertising
case so as to enjoin the advertiser from making product claims in
addition to those covered by the original order."8 The court in Elmo
Co. v. FTC went so far as to hold that the governing standard of
the public interest is the same when the agency seeks to reopen a
final order as when it decides to issue a new complaint. The FTC,
however, does not always modify its orders so readily when requested
to do so by a respondent. In Lakeland Nurseries Sales Corp.,49 the
FTC refused to set aside an eleven-year-old order even though the
corporate respondent had gone out of business and the individual re-
spondents had sold their interests in the nursery business and cove-
nanted not to compete with their successors for five years. The FTC
decided it was still in the public interest to continue the order because
the individual respondents might at some point change their minds
and reenter the nursery business.
Rights of Third Persons
Recent court decisions have greatly expanded the standing of
persons affected by governmental action to challenge its validity.
Most of this new body of law has centered on standing to obtain
judicial review of administrative action,5" but there has also been
46. See the discussion of exclusive jurisdiction supra at p. 314.
47. United States v. United Shoe Machinery Corp., 391 U.S. 244 (1968).
48. Elmo Co. v. FTC, 389 F.2d 550 (D.C. Cir. 1967).
49. 3 TRADE REG. REP. 18,521, at 20,877 (1968) ; this case is also discussed in
38 ANTITRUST L.J. 486-87 (1968).
50. Association of Data Processing Serv. Organizations v. Camp, 397 U.S.
150 (1970). For further discussion of judicial review of administrative action, see
31 MD. L. REv. 134 (1971).
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considerable litigation on standing to intervene in or to initiate ad-
ministrative or judicial proceedings.5" Under this new body of law
the inclusion of time limits in decrees and the modification or dissolution
of outstanding decrees is not a matter solely for the agency and the
respondent. The respondent's competitors, consumer or environmental
groups, state agencies, and individual victims of the respondent's
illegal practices may seek to participate in any proceedings to formu-
late or modify a decree. This recommendation does not treat the
problem of the standing of these persons to intervene. Intervention
in judicial proceedings is presently governed by Rule 24 of the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 15 of the Federal Rules of
Appellate Procedure, and by relevant federal statutes."' Intervention
in administrative proceedings is governed by the common law of
standing and by agency rules of practice. 8
This recommendation is not intended to bring about any changes
in this body of law. The standing of interested third persons to
intervene in proceedings to formulate or modify a decree does not
adversely affect this recommendation. The standing of third persons
to intervene does not mean that they may dictate the result or hamstring
the proceedings. Their views should be heard but they are not con-
trolling. Furthermore, they may not prevent a settlement between
the agency and the respondent on a particular issue or on the entire
case; they may simply challenge that settlement on further review. 4
Part A of this recommendation provides, however, that the effect
on the interests of third persons of the modification or dissolution of
a decree is a relevant factor which the agency should consider in
determining whether modification or dissolution is appropriate.
51. National Welfare Rights Organization v. Finch, 429 F.2d 725 (D.C. Cir. 1970).
52. In Cascade Natural Gas Corp. v. El Paso Natural Gas Co., 386 U.S. 129(1967), the Court held that a customer of one of the companies to be formed by a
consent decree of divestiture in an antitrust case was entitled to intervene as of right
under the new Rule 24(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure because of its in-
terest in seeing that the company created by the divestiture was viable and able to
supply its requirements. Subsequent decisions have limited Cascade to its special
facts and explained the result in that case on the basis of the Court's dissatisfaction
with the substantive provisions of the decree. Smuck v. Hobson, 408 F.2d 175, 179
n.16 (D.C. Cir. 1969). Thus, public bodies have been denied intervention under Rule
24 to challenge a consent decree in a civil antitrust action brought by the United
States against the major automobile manufacturers charging a conspiracy to eliminate
competition in the development of anti-pollution devices. United States v. Automobile
Mfrs. Ass'n, Inc., 307 F. Supp. 617 (C.D. Cal. 1969), aff'd sub nom. City of New
York v. United States, 397 U.S. 248 (1970).
Rule 15 of the Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure only governs the pro-
cedure for intervention in review proceedings in the courts of appeals, and the right of
interested persons to intervene depends on the particular statutory scheme of the agency
involved. Local 283, UAW v. Scofield, 382 U.S. 205 (1965). In Scofield the Court
held the National Labor Relations Act conferred on the party who was successful in
the proceeding before the Board an absolute right to intervene in the enforcement or
review proceedings in the court of appeals.
53. City of San Antonio v. CAB, 374 F.2d 326, 331-33 (D.C. Cir. 1967) (new
route proceeding); Office of Communication of United Church of Christ v. FCC,
359 F.2d 994 (D.C. Cir. 1966) (license renewal); In re Firestone Tire & Rubber
Co., No. 8818 (F.T.C., June 29, 1970) (student group granted intervention in false
advertising case). See generally Shapiro, Some Thoughts on Intervention Before
Courts, Agencies, and Arbitrators, 81 HARV. L. REv. 721 (1968).
54. National Welfare Rights Organization v. Finch, 429 F.2d 725, 739 (D.C.
Cir. 1970).
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SPECIFIC ASPECTS OF THE RECOMMENDATION
Recommendation 30" seeks to alleviate the problems raised by cease
and desist orders and injunctions that have outlived their usefulness
by proposing new procedures and more flexible standards for modifica-
tion and dissolution. Part A covers cease and desist orders over which
the issuing agency retains jurisdiction. Part B, on the other hand,
covers injunctions obtained by agencies from the federal courts and
agency cease and desist orders that have. been enforced in the courts
and over which the courts retain exclusive jurisdiction. In situations
covered by Part A, the agency has authority to modify or vacate the
decree on its own, while in the latter two situations the agency must
obtain the cooperation of the court to modify or vacate an outstanding
decree. The appropriate means for the agency to secure this coopera-
tion is to join or concur with the respondent in a motion to modify
or vacate the decree. The modification or dissolution of a judicial
decree is, of course, a judicial function within the control of the
court, but a court should surely accord great weight to the agency's
view on the appropriate disposition of the matter. The agency is
not merely a private litigant invoking the judicial process; it is, in
addition, a public body charged by statute with the protection of the
public interest. 6 The courts should, therefore, ordinarily show
considerable deference to the judgment of the agency when the
agency decides that the continuation of the decree in its present form
is no longer in the public interest.
Standards for Modification or Dissolution
The standards or factors which an agency should consider in
determining whether the modification or dissolution of a particular
decree or portion thereof is justified include the period of time the
decree has been in effect, changed conditions of fact or law during
that time, the respondent's compliance with the decree, the likelihood
of further violations of the decree, the hardship which the decree
imposes on the respondent, the extent of the respondent's compliance
with requirements of the law that are related to those covered by
the decree, the interests of other persons or parties affected by the
decree, the importance of the decree to the agency's overall enforce-
ment program, and the public interest in the effective enforcement of
the law. All of these factors should be considered by the agency in
determining whether the continuation of the decree in its present form
is in the public interest. Such an inquiry, which involves a balancing
of competing considerations, permits a flexible response by the agency
to the problem of long-standing decrees.
This approach is preferable to the rigid Swift formulation which
requires the continuation of existing decrees in the absence of "a
clear showing of grievous wrong evoked by new and unforeseen
conditions."57 The principal advantage of the more flexible approach
55. For a text of Recommendation 30, see note 1 supra.
56. P. Lorillard Co. v. FTC, 186 F.2d 52, 55 (4th Cir. 1950).
57. 286 U.S. at 119.
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is that it should alleviate the problems associated with permanent
decrees that may become obsolete with the passage of time. Agencies
will still be able to obtain effective relief at the time of the entry
of the decree, but respondents will not need to suffer in perpetuity
harm or inconvenience that is unneccesary from an enforcement or
public interest point of view. The opportunity to obtain eventual
modification or dissolution may also be an incentive for respondents
to obey the decree and related provisions of the law.
Cease and Desist Orders
The provisions of Parts A and B on the modification or dissolution
of cease and desist orders issued by administrative agencies are con-
sistent with the existing powers enjoyed by agencies and enforcing
courts to modify or set aside outstanding orders. The FTC has broad
statutory authority to modify or set aside a final order whenever
"conditions of fact or of law have so changed as to require such
action or if the public interest shall so require.""8 The FTC apparently
may even modify or set aside those orders that have been affirmed
or enforced by a reviewing court. The authority of the NLRB over
its own orders is more limited. Prior to the filing in the court of
appeals of the record in a case, the Board has plenary power to modify
or set aside its own orders.6 9 However, once the record has been
filed in the appropriate court of appeals, that court has exclusivejurisdiction over the order."0 Any order of the NLRB that is enforced
in whole or in part by the court thus becomes the court's order and
the Board does not retain any authority to modify or set aside such
an order.6 This doctrine of exclusive jurisdiction operates in a
number of other areas to prevent an agency from modifying or setting
aside its own orders once they have been enforced by a court.62 In
these areas, however, the doctrine has a lesser impact than in the
case of NLRB orders because the orders of these agencies become
final automatically if no judicial review is sought within a prescribed
period by the respondent; therefore, only a small percentage of an
agency's orders are ever enforced by a court and subject to the doctrine.
The NLRB, on the other hand, must routinely enforce its orders in
the courts of appeals because sanctions may be imposed only for
violation of a judicial decree enforcing a Board order.
The doctrine of exclusive jurisdiction does not prevent a court
from modifying or vacating its own enforcing decree or from re-
manding the case to the agency to allow the agency to modify or vacate
its underlying order.63 The court retains ultimate control over the
58. 15 U.S.C. §§ 21(b), 45(b) (1970) ; see note 43 supra and accompanying text.
59. 29 U.S.C. § 160(d) (1970).
60. Id. §§ 160(e), (f).
61. International Mine Workers v. Eagle-Picher Mining & Smelting Co., 325
U.S. 335 (1945).
62. See 7 U.S.C. § 194(h) (1970) (cease-and-desist orders issued by the Depart-
ment of Agriculture under the Packers and Stockyards Act); 49 U.S.C. § 1486(d)
(1970) (CAB and FAA orders).
63. Jaffe & Vining, Exclusive Jurisdiction and Remand, in JUDICIAL CONTROL OF
ADmmisTRATiW AcrroN 709-20 (L. Jaffe ed. 1965).
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order, but it naturally should accord great weight to an agency's
request on account of the agency's greater experience with enforcement
problems. The agency has overall responsibility for maintaining an
effective enforcement program that is both fair and flexible; the court,
on the other hand, is only concerned with. the integrity of its particular
decree. For these reasons courts have recognized that agencies enjoy
broad powers following a remand to modify or vacate their previous
orders." Part B encourages this fruitful working relationship be-
tween an agency and an enforcing court by providing that in cases
where the court has exclusive jurisdiction over a cease and desist order
initially issued by an agency, the agency should join with the respondent
in appropriate cases to move the court to modify or set aside the
order or to remand the proceeding to the agency to permit it to do so.
The agency should have available a procedure whereby a respondent
may request the agency to join with it in such a motion. In deciding
whether or not to concur with such a request, the agency should
consider the same factors it should consider under Part A when it
decides whether or not to modify or vacate a cease and desist order
over which it retains jurisdiction.
Injunctions
Part B contains similar provisions on the modification or dissolution
of court injunctions. Each agency that obtains a significant number
of injunctions in the federal courts should have a procedure available
whereby a respondent may request the agency to join or concur with
it in moving the court to modify or vacate an outstanding injunction.
The agency should consider the same factors in acting upon this type
of request as an agency should consider in deciding whether or not to
modify or vacate one of its own cease and desist orders. When the
agency determines that the injunction should be modified or vacated
it should join or concur with the respondent in moving the court
to do so. The Antitrust Division reports that when it has agreed
with a respondent on the modification of a judgment the courts have
usually granted the request for modification.
It is, of course, possible that the courts will disregard the pro-
posed standards and continue to apply the rigid Swift rule on the
modification or dissolution of judicial decrees. This reaction by the
courts would largely frustrate the implementation of Part B. Such
an outcome seems quite unlikely because there is no indication that
the Swift rule applies when the government and the respondent join
in a request for modification or dissolution. Furthermore, the Supreme
Court has made clear that the Swift rule does not apply when the
government seeks to modify a decree to obtain additional, more
effective relief than provided in the original decree. 65 Is not Swift
equally inapplicable when the government seeks to modify or vacate
a decree on the grounds that all or part of the relief provided by the
decree is no longer necessary? The answer seems clearly to be yes.
64. Id. at 713.
65. United States v. United Shoe Machinery Corp., 391 U.S. 244 (1968).
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In both situations the courts must recognize that the government
agency represents the public interest and has the principal responsibility
for determining enforcement policy. Since the respondent is not
contesting the modification or dissolution of the injunction, any objec-
tion is likely to come from third party intervenors. The fact that
the intervenor is usually motivated by his private interests and that
the agency is acting on the basis of the broader interest of the public
as a whole suggests that in this situation the court should ordinarily
show deference to the judgment of the latter in matters relating to
settlement or remedy."
Modification Procedures
No specific procedures for modification or dissolution are proposed
in Parts A and B because of the wide variety of proceedings covered
by them. Each agency affected by them should insure that appropriate
procedures are available whereby a respondent may request the agency
to modify or vacate a cease and desist order that has become final or tojoin or concur with it in moving the court to do so in the case of an
injunction or order over which the court retains jurisdiction. In ruling
upon the respondent's request the agency should consider the factors
itemized in Part A. A description of the procedures which are
available should be made public and, in the case of agencies that
enter cease and desist orders in formal adjudicatory procedures, should
normally be included in the agency's rules of practice. These procedures
should permit a flexible response by the agency to requests for modi-
fication or dissolution. The agency should have the authority to rule
on such requests on the basis of the written pleadings and briefs or
on the basis of affidavits, documents or whatever other evidence it
finds necessary for a proper decision in the case. Formal hearings
should be necessary only in those rare cases where critical facts are in
dispute. In all cases the agency should communicate its decision and
the basis thereof to the party seeking modification or dissolution.
The implementation of Parts A and B along these lines will
require some affirmative action by most agencies. While all agencies
that commented on this recommendation recognized the appropriateness
of modifying or vacating outstanding decrees in at least some situations,
only a minority of agencies have available publicized procedures as
contemplated by Parts A and B. In addition, while the majority of
agencies expressed general agreement with the standards for modifica-
tion or dissolution proposed in Part A, these standards have not been
articulated by the agencies so as to give guidance to respondents as
to when modification or dissolution is possible. Most agencies leave
the matter to be worked out informally on a case by case basis by the
attorneys for the respective parties. The FDA, SEC, ICC, and Anti-
trust Division all report that, in a limited number of cases, counsel
for the agency and for the respondent have agreed that an outstanding
decree should be modified or vacated. The courts and agencies involved
66. Shapiro, Some Thoughts on Intervention Before Courts, Agencies, and Arbi-
trators, 81 HARV. L. REv. 721, 746 n.114 (1968).
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have generally gone along with these agreements and modified or
vacated the decrees accordingly. The Civil Rights Division has gone
one step further and inserts in many injunctions in housing and
employment cases a provision that the respondent may seek to dissolve
the injunction in a given number of years with the understanding
that the Division will not oppose such a motion if there have been
no violations of the law in the interim period.
While these ad hoc procedures have seemingly worked smoothly
in cases in which they have been invoked, it seems desirable for an
agency to publicize the availability of procedures for modification or
dissolution of outstanding decrees and to articulate the standards to
be applied. This action would assure that all respondents are informed
about the opportunities for modfication or dissolution and enable the
agency to apply its policy with respect to modification and dissolution
in an even handed manner. Rule 3.72 of the FTC satisfies these
criteria and still insures that the agency has sufficient flexibility in
ruling upon requests for modification or dissolution.67
67. Rule 3.72 reads as follows:
§ 3.72 Reopening.
(a) Before statutory review. At any time prior to the expiration of the time
allowed for filing a petition for review or prior to the filing of the transcript of
the record of a proceeding in a U.S. court of appeals pursuant to a petition for
review, the Commission may upon its own initiative and without prior notice to
the parties reopen the proceeding and enter a new decision modifying or setting
aside the whole or any part of the findings as to the facts, conclusions, rule, order,
or opinion issued by the Commission in such proceeding.
(b) After decision has become final. (1) Whenever the Commission is of
the opinion that changed conditions of fact or law or the public interest may
require that a Commission decision containing a rule or order which has become
effective, or an order to cease and desist which has become final by reason of
court affirmance or expiration of the statutory period for court review without a
petition for review having been filed, or a Commission decision containing an
order dismissing a proceeding, should be altered, modified, or set aside in whole
or in part, the Commission will serve upon each person subject to such decision
(in the case of proceedings instituted under § 3.13, such service may be by publi-
cation in the FEDERAL REGISTER) an order to show cause, stating the changes it
proposes to make in the decision and the reasons they are deemed necessary.
Within thirty (30) days after service of such order to show cause, any person
served may file an answer thereto. Any person not responding to the order within
the time allowed may be deemed to have consented to the proposed changes.
(2) Whenever any person subject to a decision containing a rule or order
which has become effective, or an order to cease and desist which has become
final, is of the opinion that changed conditions of fact or law require that said
rule or order be altered, modified, or set aside, or that the public interest so
requires, such person may file with the Commission a petition requesting a re-
opening of the proceeding for that purpose. The petition shall state the changes
desired, the grounds therefor, and shall include, when available, such supporting
evidence and argument as will in the absence of a contest provide the basis for a
Commission decision on the petition. Within thirty (30) days after service of
such a petition, the Director of the appropriate bureau of the Commission shall
file an answer.
(3) Whenever an order to show cause or petition to reopen is not opposed,
or if opposed but the pleadings do not raise issues of fact to be resolved, the
Commission, in its discretion, may decide the matter on the order to show cause
or petition and answer thereto, or it may serve upon the parties (in the case of
proceedings instituted under § 3.13, such service may be by publication in the
FEDERAL REGISTER) a notice of hearing, setting forth the C tte when the cause
will be heard. In such a case, the hearing will be limited to the filing of briefs
and may include oral argument when deemed necessary by the Commission. When
the pleadings raise substantial factual issues, the Commission will direct such
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The FTC rule permits the Commission to modify or set aside a
final order only when "changed conditions of fact or law," or "the
public interest" require it. In its formal comment on an earlier
version of this recommendation, the FTC expressed doubts as to
whether all of the factors proposed in Part A meet this requirement
and questioned the need for incorporating these factors into the
Commission's rules. In particular, the Commission doubted that the
fact that an order was old or imposed a hardship on the respondent
was necessarily dispositive of the statutory requirement of the public
interest. In response to the FTC's concern, the Committee has added
to the text of Part A the new factor of the public interest in the
enforcement of the law. Furthermore, it is intended that the agency
should consider all the relevant factors in passing upon a request for
modification or dissolution and that no one factor is intended to be
dispositive. It is a matter for agency discretion whether the agency
itemizes all these factors in its rules or simply adheres to them in its
decisional process under a more broadly stated rule. The agency
need only make known in some convenient fashion those standards
which it is applying.
The Federal Maritime Commission (FMC) is presently consider-
ing the adoption of a rule similar to that of the FTC. Its present
rule provides that a party must file a petition for reconsideration with
respect to a cease and desist order within thirty days. The FMC
recognizes that this procedure is inadequate in the important area of
orders based on practices which are labeled unreasonable because
what may be unreasonable at one time may not be so at a later date."
The new FMC rule will most likely be consistent with these recom-
mendations. The NLRB's member of the Administrative Conference,
on the other hand, strongly opposes formalizing existing procedures and
favors modifying or vacating outstanding decrees only in rare cases
where new or unforeseen circumstances permit modification or dissolu-
tion under the rule in Swift & Co. He believes that the implementation
of this recommendation will lead to a host of frivolous petitions for
modification that will waste the time of the Board and of the courts.
The majority of the Conference does not share this judgment.
hearings as it deems appropriate, including hearings for the receipt of evidence
by it or by a hearing examiner. Unless otherwise ordered and insofar as prac-
ticable, hearings before a hearing examiner to receive evidence shall be conducted
in accordance with Subparts B, C, D, and E of Part 3 of this chapter. Upon
conclusion of hearings before a hearing examiner, the record and the hearing
examiner's recommendations shall be certified to the Commission for final dis-
position of the matter.
16 C.F.R. § 3.72 (1971).
68. Investigation of Free Time Practices - Port of San Diego, 9 F.M.C. 525
(1966).
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